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Abstract 
On 25 March 2014 the European Court of Human Rights delivered a controversial judgment in a case 
on family reunion in Denmark, the Biao case. The applicants were a Danish national, Mr Ousmane 
Ghanian Biao, and his wife, a Ghanaian national, Mrs Asia Adamo Biao. They alleged that a refusal 
by the Danish authorities to grant them family reunion was in breach of the European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR) article 8, alone and in conjunction with article 14.  
The Danish authorities had refused the application for family reunion because the spouses did not 
fulfil the requirement that their aggregate ties to Denmark be stronger than their aggregate ties to any 
other state where they could live together – in this case Ghana (‘the attachment requirement’). They 
submitted that the decision breached their rights under article 8 of the ECHR since it did not pursue a 
legitimate aim on the ground that it was introduced to target Danish citizens of non-Danish ethnic or 
national origin. Alternatively, if the refusal was not deemed to be contrary to article 8, they claimed 
that it was contrary to the prohibition against discrimination, cf. ECHR article 14 read in conjunction 
with article 8, since particular groups of Danish citizens were treated differently in relation to family 
reunion in Denmark. In analogous circumstances, those who were born Danish citizens would be 
exempted from the attachment requirement according to the so-called ‘28-year rule’ which states that 
the requirement does not apply in cases where the resident person applying for family reunion has 
been a Danish citizen for 28 years cf. the Aliens Act section 9(7). 
The complaint regarding the attachment requirement’s conformity with article 8 will not be dealt with 
here. This paper will primarily deal with the question whether a state lawfully can treat its citizens 
differently solely on the basis of how and when they acquired their citizenship. 
In this context the significance of the European Convention on Nationality (ECN) article 5(2), will be 
analysed. Article 5(2) states that in matters of nationality, state parties shall be guided by the principle 
of non-discrimination between their citizens, whether they are citizens by birth or have acquired their 
citizenship subsequently. 
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1. The case 
The first complainant Mr Biao was born in Togo. From the age of six to 21 he lived in Ghana where 
he attended school for ten years. He speaks the local language. In 1993, when he was 22 years old, he 
entered Denmark and applied for asylum, which was refused. In the meantime he married a Danish 
citizen whom he divorced in 1998. He was granted a permanent residence permit in 1997 and on 22 
April 2002 acquired Danish citizenship. On 22 February 2003 he and Asia Adamo Biao married in 
Ghana where she was born, and on 28 February 2003, at the Danish embassy in Accra, Ghana, Mrs 
Biao requested a residence permit for Denmark with reference to her marriage with Mr Biao. At that 
time, Mrs Biao had not visited Denmark. She and her parents lived in Ghana. Mr Biao had no close 
family in Denmark. He and his wife communicated in the Hausa and Twi languages. On 1 July 2003, 
the Danish Immigration Service refused the request for family reunion, since it was not established 
that the spouses’ aggregate ties to Denmark were stronger than their attachment to any other country 
(as required by the Aliens Act, section 9(7)). 
In July or August 2003, Mrs Biao entered Denmark on a tourist visa. On 28 August 2003 she 
appealed the Immigration Service’s refusal to the then Ministry of Integration. The appeal did not have 
suspensive effect, and on 15 November 2003 the couple moved to Sweden (where they could settle 
according to EU law). 
By Act no. 1204 of 27 December 2003, the Aliens Act, section 9(7), was amended so that the 
attachment requirement was lifted for persons who had held Danish citizenship for (at least) 28 years 
(the so called 28-year rule). In addition persons who were born or had arrived in Denmark as small 
children could be exempted from the attachment requirement, provided that they had resided lawfully 
and in essence continuously in the country for 28 years. 
In May 2004 Mrs and Mr Biao had a son. He was born in Sweden and acquired Danish citizenship 
at birth after his father. The same year, the Ministry of Integration upheld the Immigration Service’s 
refusal to grant Mrs Biao a residence permit in Denmark. In 2006, the couple instituted proceedings 
before the High Court of Eastern Denmark against the Ministry of Integration. They submitted, among 
other things, that Mr Biao and thus also Mrs Biao were discriminated against as an applicant for 
family reunion who was born Danish citizen and at the same age as Mr Biao would be exempt from 
the attachment requirement, while Mr Biao could not be exempted until 2030 when he had reached the 
age of 59. 
By a judgment of 25 September 2007, the High Court unanimously found that the refusal did not 
contravene the articles of the ECHR or the ECN. In relation to the ECN the Court noted as follows: 
ECN article 5 may according to the Explanatory Report be taken to mean that article 5(1) concern 
the conditions for acquisition of citizenship, while article 5(2) concerns the principle of non-
discrimination. It appears from the report that it is not an obligatory rule which the contracting 
states must follow in all cases. In light of this, article 5 is considered to offer protection against 
discrimination to an extent that goes no further than the protection against discrimination 
following from article 14 of the ECHR.
1
  
The assessment of whether the refusal implied discrimination would hereafter depend on whether the 
difference in treatment that occurred regardless of citizenship as a result of the attachment requirement 
could be considered objectively justified and proportional. The High Court found no sufficient basis 
for holding that this was not the case. 
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 See the judgment from the Eastern High Court’s 16 Department, 33. 
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Mrs and Mr Biao appealed the judgment to the Supreme Court, which passed its judgment on 13 
January 2010.
2
 In the ruling on the question on discrimination, a narrow majority of four judges found 
no basis in the case law that the 28-year rule implied discrimination in relation to the ECHR. The 
majority held that it is not in itself contrary to the Convention if a state treats groups of citizens 
differently in relation to family reunion. In this regard they referred to the judgment of 28 May 1985 
from the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali v the UK.
3
 
In this case the Court found that it was not contrary to the Convention that a person born in Egypt who 
had later moved to the UK and become a British citizen was treated less favourably as regards the 
right to family reunion than a citizen born in the UK or whose parents were born in the UK. The 
criterion of 28 years of Danish citizenship had, according to the Supreme Court, the same aim as the 
requirement of birth in the UK, namely to distinguish a group of citizens who, from a general 
perspective, has lasting and long ties with the country. 
With regard to article 5(2) of the ECN the majority found, ‘for the reasons stated by the High 
Court, that the convention’s article 5(2) cannot lead to the result that the prohibition against 
discrimination enshrined in the European Convention on Human Rights article 14 read in conjunction 
with article 8 is given a more far reaching content than what follows from the judgment of 1985.’ 
Hereafter, the four judges found that the refusal of family reunion did not violate the ECHR article 
14 in conjunction with article 8.  
The minority of three judges (including the President of the Court) found that the 28-year rule 
represented indirect discrimination between persons who were born Danish citizens and persons who 
had acquired Danish citizenship later in life; and since persons who were born Danish citizens would 
usually be of Danish ethnic origin whereas persons who acquired Danish citizenship at a later point in 
time would generally be of foreign ethnic origin, the 28-year rule also entailed indirect discrimination 
between ethnic Danish citizens and Danish citizens with a different ethnic background. In their 
opinion, both types of indirect discrimination should be considered within article 14 in conjunction 
with article 8 of the ECHR. 
The Ministry of Integration had held that ECN article 5(2) exclusively concerned issues on 
deprivation and loss of citizenship. The minority in the Supreme Court contested this view. The three 
judges doubted whether there was any basis for such restrictive interpretation of the wording of the 
provision. They considered it to be a general provision establishing that any difference in treatment 
between different groups of a state’s own citizens is basically prohibited. In their opinion this 
distinguished the case from Abdulaziz because difference in treatment on the basis of place of birth is 
not comparable to difference in treatment on the basis of how long a person has been a citizen. They 
emphasised in particular that it is not sufficient to compare persons not raised in Denmark who acquire 
Danish citizenship later in life with the large group of persons who are born Danish citizens and raised 
in Denmark. The crucial element is to make a comparison with persons who are born Danish citizens 
and have been Danish citizens for 28 years, but who are not raised in Denmark and may not at any 
time have had their residence in Denmark. According to the dissenting judges, it can not generally be 
considered that this group of Danish citizens has stronger ties with Denmark than persons who have 
acquired Danish citizenship after having entered and resided in Denmark for a number of years. 
Against this background, the minority did not find the difference in treatment created by the 28-year 
rule objectively justified; they found it contrary to article 14 read in conjunction with article 8 of the 
ECHR. The consequence of this was, according to the minority, that when applying the Aliens Act 
section 9(7) to Danish citizens, the authorities must limit the 28-year rule to being solely an age 
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requirement, meaning that the attachment requirement should not apply in cases in which the resident 
spouse was a Danish citizen and at least 28 years old. 
2. The judgment of the European Court of Human Rights 
Interestingly enough, the ECtHR was divided in its assessment in exactly the same way as the Danish 
Supreme Court. Among seven judges, four held that there had been no violation of ECHR article 14 in 
conjunction with article 8, while three judges respectfully disagreed. 
First the Court applied the ambit test. Since clearly the case falls within the ambit of ECHR article 
8, article 14 was in principle applicable.  
Subsequently the Court considered whether there had been a difference in treatment of persons in 
analogous, or relevantly similar, situations based on ‘status’ (among others race, ethnicity or any other 
status) covered by article 14.  
In this relation, the Court took into consideration the aim of the 28-year rule. The Court agreed 
with the majority of the Supreme Court ‘according to which the only intention behind the introduction 
of the 28-year rule was to provide for a positive treatment in favour of persons who had been Danish 
nationals for 28 years, or who were not Danish nationals but who were born and raised in Denmark 
and had stayed there legally for 28 years, the reason being that this group was considered to have such 
strong ties with Denmark, when assessed from a general perspective, that it would be unproblematic to 
grant them family reunion with a foreign spouse or cohabitant in Denmark. This group should 
therefore be exempted from the attachment requirement’ (p. 89). 
The applicants had alleged that they had been treated differently based partly on Mr Biao’s 
acquisition of citizenship later in life, and partly, indirectly, on their ethnic origin.  
The Court agreed with the minority of the Supreme Court that the 28-year rule had the consequence 
of creating an indirect difference in treatment between Danish citizens of Danish ethnic origin and 
Danish citizens of another origin. Still, the Court found that there had been no discrimination based on 
race etc. In this regard the Court recalled the arguments in Abdulaziz that a state’s preferential 
treatment to citizens or persons from countries with which it had the closest links did not constitute 
“racial discrimination”. Likewise, on the material before it, and recalling that non-Danish citizens who 
were born and/or raised in Denmark and who had stayed lawfully in the country for 28-years, were 
also exempted from the attachment requirement, in the Court’s view the applicants had failed to 
substantiate the claim that they were discriminated against on the basis of race or ethnic origin in the 
application of the 28-year rule (p. 90). 
The ECtHR concluded that the applicants were treated differently because the first applicant had 
been a Danish citizen for fewer than 28 years as opposed to persons who had been Danish citizens for 
‘more than 28 years’. The Court accepted that in this respect the applicants enjoyed ’other status’ (p. 
91). 
Hereafter, the decisive question was whether the difference in treatment had an objective and 
reasonable justification.  
The Court observed that there had been no recent case law departing from the principles and the 
conclusions drawn in Abdulaziz, ‘including the statement “that there are in general persuasive social 
reasons for giving special treatment to those who have strong ties with a country, whether stemming 
from birth within it or from being a national or a long-term resident” (§ 88)’. The Court ‘thus accepted 
that the aim put forward by the Government for introducing the 28-year rule exception was legitimate 
for the purposes of the Convention’ (p. 94). 
In addition, the Court could, briefly, agree with the Supreme Court that Article 5(2) of ECN ‘has no 
importance for the interpretation of Article 14 of the Convention in the present case’. 
Eva Ersbøll 
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It then remained to be determined whether there was a reasonable relationship of proportionality 
between the means employed and the aim sought to be realised. In relation to the proportionality test, 
the majority of the Supreme Court had compared the material aspects in the case to that of 
Mrs Balkandali’s situation in Abdulaziz and found them almost identical since both applicants were 
citizens and married to a foreign spouse, and both came to their new country (Denmark and the United 
Kingdom respectively) as adults. In Mr Biao’s case, the application for family reunion was refused 
when he had resided in Denmark for 11 years, two of them as a Danish citizen. In Mrs Balkandali’s 
case, the application was refused after she had resided in the United Kingdom for eight years, two of 
them as a British citizen. 
In addition, the Court found it pertinent to examine more thoroughly the aim of the 28-year rule. It 
reiterated the viewpoint that the aim of the rule was to distinguish a group of citizens who, seen from a 
general perspective, had lasting and long ties with Denmark so that it would be unproblematic to grant 
family reunion with a foreign spouse because it would normally be possible for such a spouse to be 
successfully integrated into Danish society.  
The remaining question was then, according to the Court, when in general it could be said that a 
person who has acquired citizenship in a country has created so strong ties with that country that 
family reunion with a foreign partner has prospects of being successful from an integration point of 
view (p. 99). The Court noted that the Danish Government considered that 28 years of citizenship 
were needed in this respect. In this connection the ECtHR remarked:  
It is not for the Court to lay down a specific limit for the time that may be required. 
However, to conclude that in order to be presumed to have strong ties with a country, one 
has to have direct ties with that country for at least 28 years appears excessively strict. 
The Court is not convinced either that in general it can be concluded that the strength of 
one’s ties continuously and significantly increases after, for example, 10, 15 or 20 years 
in a country. 
Moreover, the Court recalled that all persons born as Danish citizens were exempted from the 
attachment requirement as soon as they turned 28 years-old, whether or not they had lived in Denmark 
and whether or not they had retained strong ties with Denmark. Also non-Danish nationals who had 
resided in Denmark since early childhood were exempted after 28 years of legal stay in the country. 
However, persons who were not raised in Denmark and had acquired Danish citizenship later in life 
were covered by the attachment rule until 28 years had passed after they acquired their Danish 
citizenship. In light of these facts, the Court endorsed the view of the minority of the Supreme Court 
that the 28-year rule affected this group of citizens to a far greater extent than persons born with 
Danish citizenship. The Court realised that this group had very little benefit from the 28 year 
exemption – a finding, the Court noted, that was in line with that of the Commissioner for Human 
Rights who in 2004 had called it discriminatory and an excessive restriction to the right to family life 
(p. 100-102).  
All the same, the ECtHR did not follow up on this finding. The reasoning of the Court was as 
follows: 
The Court must point out that where national legislation is in issue, it is not the Court’s 
task to review the relevant legislation in the abstract. Instead, it must confine itself, as far 
as possible, to examining the issues raised by the case before it’ (p. 103).  
After this, the Court returned to the question whether there was proportionality between the means 
employed and the aim sought to be realised by the 28-year rule in the applicants’ case. This was done 
by analysing the applicants’ ties with Denmark, which the Court found ‘at the relevant time’ (2003) 
were clearly not stronger than their ties to another country – in this case Togo and Ghana. The Court 
recalled that the first applicant had been a Danish citizen for less than two years when he was refused 
family reunion. To refuse to exempt the applicant from the attachment requirement after such a short 
time could not in the Court’s view be considered disproportionate to the aim of the 28-year rule, 
Biao v. Denmark – Discrimination among citizens? 
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‘namely to exempt from the attachment requirement a group of nationals who, seen from a general 
perspective, had lasting and long ties with Denmark so that it would be unproblematic to grant family 
reunion with a foreign spouse because it would normally be possible for such spouse to be 
successfully integrated into Danish society’. Accordingly, in the specific circumstances of the present 
case, the majority of the Court found that there had been no violation of article 14 taken in conjunction 
with article 8 of the ECHR. 
The minority in the ECtHR disagreed. The three judges found it impossible to think of ECHR 
article 14 as permitting ‘second-class citizenship’ (joint dissenting opinion p. 8). In their opinion the 
‘purportedly neutral 28-year rule singled out a group of citizens, naturalised foreigners, and gave 
privileged treatment to Danish citizens by birth (p. 10). They also pointed to the ECN which they 
found could not be disregarded in the interpretation of ECHR article 14 even if the majority of the 
Danish Supreme Court considered it non-binding (p.14). They noted that the special treatment in 
Abdulaziz was not based on the length of citizenship but stemmed from birth within the country (p. 
17). They dismissed the viewpoint of the majority that the Court’s task is not to review the relevant 
legislation in the abstract, among other things by reference to the case of X. and Others v. Austria 
where the Grand Chamber found a difference in treatment created by a law to be inherently suspect as 
the law contained an absolute prohibition making any examination of the specific circumstances of a 
case unnecessary (p. 22); likewise in the present case where naturalised citizens were treated less 
favourably than born citizens without an objective justification (p. 23). Consequently the dissenting 
judges found that ECHR article 14 in conjunction with article 8 had been violated. 
3. Comments  
3.1. General remarks 
Unfortunately, in certain respects the argumentation of the majority of the ECtHR is relatively brief. 
Arguably, the aims of the extended attachment requirement and the 28-year rule should have been 
subjected to closer examination, some viewpoints could have been more thoroughly elaborated and 
some statements leave unanswered questions as to their premise. In the following this apparent 
incompleteness will be dealt with. 
3.2. The aim of the 28-year rule 
While the ECtHR attaches significant importance to the aim of the 28-year rule, its description of that 
aim does not appear quite accurate. The Court assumes that the aim of the 28-year rule was to 
distinguish a group of nationals who ‘seen from a general perspective’ had lasting and long ties to 
Denmark so that it would be unproblematic to grant family reunion with a foreign spouse from an 
integration perspective.  
This understanding is not accurate since the specific aim of the rule was to help Danish expatriates 
who, after the introduction of the attachment rule in 2002, had experienced difficulties when they 
wanted to settle in Denmark with their foreign family. After a number of years abroad, they might not 
be able to fulfil the attachment requirement. This unforeseen problem, which had to be solved, is 
explicitly described in the preparatory report to the Bill introducing the 28-year rule.
4
 
The Court, however, maintained that the remaining question was when in general it could be said 
that a person who has acquired citizenship in a country has created so strong ties with that country that 
family reunion with a foreign spouse has prospects of being successful from an integration point of 
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view. The Court found a requirement of ties for at least 28 years excessively strict; it was not 
convinced that a person’s ties to a country would increase after 10, 15 or 20 years in the country. 
The Court did not take into account the broader aim of the extended attachment rule that was 
introduced in 2002. The Court noticed that the extended rule was introduced with a view to improve 
the integration of Danish citizens of foreign origin and prevent arranged and forced marriages and that 
the background was ‘a widespread pattern’ among immigrants and immigrant descendants to marry a 
person from their country of origin, among other reasons due to parental pressure – a pattern that had 
been identified among both resident foreigners and resident Danish citizens with foreign background. 
For this reason, the attachment rule was extended to include Danish citizens who were not well 
integrated in Danish society and where integration of a spouse newly arrived in Denmark might 
therefore entail problems.
5
  
Seemingly, the Court did not take into consideration that the extended attachment rule was 
introduced in 2002 together with the so called 24-year rule requiring that in cases of family reunion of 
spouses and partners, both applicants must be at least 24 years. The government foresaw that the 24-
year rule might have the effect that young Danish citizens of immigrant origin would marry in their 
country of origin and establish family life there until both spouses turned 24 and thus fulfilled the 24-
year age requirement for family reunion in Denmark. Such behaviour could hamper their integration 
even more, as the then Minister for Integration explained:  
if we content ourselves with the 24-year rule... without applying an attachment requirement, we 
will risk that the conditions become worse than before, namely that young people are sent home 
when they are 18 and then return to Denmark with family and children when they turn 24. Then, 
what will we have achieved? If the 24-year rule shall have the effect to curb arranged and forced 
marriages, the attachment requirement must necessarily also be there.
6
 
In the preparatory work to the amendments, the government gave an account of Denmark’s 
international obligations. The extended attachment requirement should apply to both resident 
foreigners and Danish citizens regardless of whether they had a foreign background or not; as such, it 
was deemed in accordance with international non-discrimination principles. As stressed by the 
government ‘the conditions apply regardless of the ethnic origin of the resident in Denmark, just as 
that person’s ethic origin in itself is without importance for the assessment’. Apparently, this broad 
application was considered important from a non-discrimination perspective. 
However, the self-same broad application turned out to have the unintended consequence that it 
precluded Danish expatriates, who had settled down and started a family abroad, from returning to and 
live with their family in Denmark. Many Danish expatriates were shocked when they realised this 
scenario, and they publicly vented their justified anger at being excluded from their native country. 
This strong and sustained criticism made a political solution to the problem necessary.
7
  
The then government had, it seems, to cut the Gordian knot since out of consideration for Danish 
expatriates it wanted to amend the extended attachment requirement, while insisting that the 24-year 
rule and the extended attachment should still achieve their originally intended goals (as stated in the 
preparatory work to the amendment). As already mentioned the attachment requirement should 
prevent immigrant descendants with Danish citizenship from being forced to marry when they turned 
for instance 18 and then live with their spouse in their country of origin until they could fulfil the 24-
year age requirement for family reunion in Denmark. For that reason, a possible time-limit for 
exemption from the attachment requirement could not be set lower than 24 years; according to the 
government, 28 years with Danish citizenship was needed. Consequently, if an immigrant descendant 
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 See L152 in the Parliamentary Journal, Folketingstidende 2001-02, 2. samling tillæg A, p. 3952 ff. at 
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6
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7
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who had acquired Danish citizenship at birth married in the country of descent at the age of 18, the 
spouses would have to wait ten years abroad before they could be exempted from the attachment 
requirement and possibly be granted family reunion in Denmark.
8
  
The Danish government did not find that the fundamental aim of extending the attachment 
requirement to Danish citizens would be forfeited by the introduction of the 28-year rule since 
Danish expatriates planning to return to Denmark one day with their family will often have 
maintained strong ties with Denmark, which are also communicated to their spouse or cohabitant 
and any children. ... Thus there will normally be a basis for a successful integration of Danish 
expatriates’ family members in Danish society. 
Arguably, this argumentation illustrates that it is not a quite adequate description of the aim of the 28-
year rule that ‘it was to distinguish a group of citizens who, seen from a general perspective, had 
lasting and long ties with Denmark’. What is more, the considerations appearing from the preparatory 
work to the 2002 and 2003 amendments illustrate that in 2002 it was not the general perception that 
attachment to Denmark would increase simultaneously with the number of years a person had been a 
Danish citizen. By contrast, in 2002 it was assumed that a Danish citizen with immigrant background 
who moved abroad at the age of 18 would lose attachment to Denmark when turning 24; at that time 
the attachment rule was expected to prevent family reunion in Denmark. With the adoption of the 28-
year rule things changed. Family reunion in Denmark became possible when the Danish-born citizen 
turned 28; however, it is inconceivable that the then government thought that a citizen, who was 
assumed to have lost his or her attachment to Denmark turning 24, would have obtained a stronger 
attachment turning 28.  
Instead, it appears as if the government presumed that the 28-year rule would have a different 
effect on Danish citizens of immigrant origin who were thinking about getting married abroad upon 
turning 18. While the rule was adopted with the aim of helping Danish emigrants of Danish origin who 
had started a family abroad, it seems to have been the presumption that for Danish citizens of another 
ethnic origin it might function as a barrier if they were thinking about getting married abroad and later 
resettling in Denmark. The different impact seems to relate to the different ‘marriage patterns’; if 
citizens of immigrant origin married very young, they would have to wait about ten years abroad 
before they could return to Denmark exempted from the attachment requirement.  
It must be emphasised that human rights and non-discrimination principles were taken into 
consideration. Based on such principles it was, as stated in the preparatory work to the amendment, 
necessary to put persons who were born and/or raised in the country on an equal footing with the 
country’s own citizens. In consequence, persons who are born and raised in Denmark or who have 
come to Denmark as small children and who have stayed in the country legally and in essence 
continuously for 28 years are also exempted from the attachment requirement.
9
 
The introduction of the 28-year rule raised another question on equal treatment, namely equal 
treatment of adopted children. It was decided, during the reading of the Bill in Parliament, to treat 
adopted children equally with children born of Danish parents – however, only small children. The age 
limit was first set at four years and then raised to six with the effect that 95 per cent of all foreign 
adopted children are treated equally with children born to Danish parents. The reason for not including 
the last five per cent of children who are adopted by Danish parents was, according to the then 
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9
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Minister for Integration, that this would place them in an unreasonably better position than persons 
who had settled in Denmark around the age of one or two years together with their foreign parents.
10
  
In summary: The aim of the 28-year rule was to help Danish expatriates while not jeopardising the 
aim of the 24-year rule and the extended attachment rule aimed at Danish citizens with immigrant 
background. Therefore, in assessing whether the difference in treatment implied by the 28-year rule 
can be justified objectively, it not sufficient to compare Danish citizens with immigrant background 
with the large group of citizens who are born Danish citizens and raised in Denmark. It is crucial, as 
the minority in the Danish Supreme Court rightly observed, to make a comparison with persons who 
are born Danish citizens and have been citizens for 28 years, but who are not raised in Denmark and 
who may perhaps not at any time have had their residence in Denmark (Danish emigrants or 
expatriates).  
To put it bluntly, the question is whether, from a general perspective, it can be assumed that Danish 
citizens with emigrant background at the age of 28 have stronger ties with Denmark than Danish 
citizens with immigrant background. 
3.3. Difference in treatment based on ‘status’  
The ECtHR concluded that the applicants had not suffered indirect discrimination based on their 
ethnic origin. I do not agree in this view. Although the 28-year rule applies to all citizens, the 
significance of the rule may, indirectly, as mentioned in section 3.2., differ for Danish-born citizens of 
Danish ethic origin and Danish-born citizens of another ethnic origin. And certainly, the significance 
differs greatly for persons who are born Danish citizens and persons who have acquired Danish 
citizenship later in their life and since the majority of persons who are born Danish citizens are of 
Danish ethnic origin whereas persons who acquire Danish citizenship at a later point in life generally 
are of foreign ethnic origin, the 28-year rule constitutes, in my opinion, indirect difference in treatment 
based on ethnicity that cannot be considered objectively justified and proportional. I will, however, not 
go further into this question, since the primary aim of the paper is to discuss whether difference in 
treatment between citizens can be justified insofar as it solely is based on how and when citizenship 
has been acquired. 
The ECtHR has rightly observed that the applicants were treated differently because the first 
applicant had been a Danish citizen for less than 28 years as opposed to persons who had been Danish 
citizens for 28 years or more; therefore, the Court accepts that the different treatment is based on 
‘other status’ for the purpose of article 14.  
This is an important observation. In my opinion, the 28-year rule is not a neutral provision. It 
explicitly provides for different treatment of citizens based on how and when they have acquired their 
citizenship and it grants the most favourable position to persons who have acquired their Danish 
citizenship at birth. These citizens form the only group among Danish citizens who are exempted from 
the attachment requirement when they turn 28. At that age they enjoy preferential treatment in relation 
to family reunion. This difference of treatment is solely based on how and when they acquired Danish 
citizenship – at birth or at a later point in time. Also other groups of Danish citizens may, mutually, be 
treated differently based on when they acquired their citizenship. In any case, in my opinion the 28-
year rule provides directly (not indirectly) for difference in treatment between Danish citizens solely 
based on how and when they have acquired their citizenship and that is, as a matter of principle, 
contrary to the ECN article 5(2). Notably, in this sense, Biao differs fundamentally from Abdulaziz 
that dealt with alleged discrimination between citizens on the ground of birthplace (within or outside 
the country). 
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3.4. The ECN article 5(2) 
In order to assess whether ECN article 5(2) is of significance for the present case, two questions of 
interpretation come about. The first question concerns the scope of the provision: that is whether it 
applies solely to citizenship legislation or whether it applies more broadly to other regulations dealing 
with citizenship, such as the Danish 28-year rule. The other question is whether the provision is a 
norm with some legal effect or whether it is only a declaration of intent. 
In relation to the first question on the scope of article 5(2), the viewpoint of the Danish government 
was, as mentioned above, that the provision solely concerns issues on deprivation and loss of 
citizenship. In the memorandum from 2005, regarding among other things, criticism from the Danish 
Institute for Human Rights of the 28-year rule,
11
 the then Ministry of Integration referred to the fact 
that ECN article 5(1) deals with acquisition of citizenship and in this connection and with regard to the 
scope of the convention, the Ministry considered that article 5(2) was only applicable to questions on 
deprivation and loss of citizenship. Consequently, according to the Ministry, the provision had no 
relevance for the 28-year rule.
12
 
How the different courts have related to this viewpoint is in my opinion not quite clear. As regards 
the significance of article 5(2), the Danish Supreme Court found ‘for the reasons stated by the High 
Court’ that this provision cannot imply that the scope of the ECHR article 14 in conjunction with 
article 8 is extended further than justified by Abdulaziz (p. 24). But what were the reasons of the High 
Court? This Court had dealt with ECN article 5, mentioning that article 5(1) concerns the conditions 
for acquisition of nationality, while article 5(2) concerns the principle of non-discrimination and, 
according to the Explanatory Report, is ‘not a mandatory rule that the Contracting States are obliged to 
observe in all situations’. Against that background the High Court concluded that ‘Article 5 is 
considered to offer protection against discrimination to an extent that goes no further than the 
protection against discrimination offered by Article 14 of the Convention’ (p. 21). The majority of the 
ECtHR summarily agreed with the Supreme Court and the Danish government that ECN article 5(2) 
‘has no importance for the interpretation of Article 14 of the Convention in the present case’ (p. 95). 
These rather brief statements from the three courts seem to leave important problems of 
interpretation unsolved. The minority of the Supreme Court, however, dealt directly with the question 
of the scope of article 5(2), finding it dubious whether there was any basis for the restrictive 
interpretation of the provision. When assessing the 28-year rule relative to article 14 read in 
conjunction with article 8 of the ECHR, these judges found it necessary to include the fact that, at least 
according to its wording, article 5(2) is a general provision stating that any difference in treatment 
between different groups of a state party’s own citizens is basically prohibited (p. 25). 
This reasoning lies near at hand when employing the methodology of interpretation provided for in 
the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
13
 According to article 31 of the Vienna 
Convention, a treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be 
given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose. Article 32 
provides for supplementary means of interpretation, including the preparatory work of the treaty and 
the circumstances of its conclusion, in order to confirm the meaning resulting from the application of 
article 31 or to determine the meaning when the interpretation according to article 31 leaves the 
meaning ambiguous or obscure, or leads to unreasonable results. 
Arguably, the wording of article 5(2) does not lack in clarity. It is not difficult to establish the 
ordinary meaning of the provision which stipulates that state parties shall be guided by the principle of 
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non-discrimination between their nationals, whether they are nationals by birth or have acquired their 
nationality subsequently. Contrary to this delimitation, article 5(1) limits its scope of application to 
‘rules of a State Party on nationality’.  
Drawing on the context, object and purpose of the ECN, it is significant that its preamble expresses 
the wish to avoid discrimination in matters of nationality and goes on to express awareness of ‘the 
right to respect for family life as contained in Article 8 of the Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental freedoms’. 
The Ministry of Integration expressed the opinion that article 5(2) should be read in conjunction 
with article 5(1). However, even if we put the clarity of the wording in article 5(2) to one side, draw 
on the context and take recourse to the preparatory work, there is no support for this viewpoint. 
Initially, during the drafting of the ECN (in 1995), the two provisions were framed independently; the 
provision on prohibition of discrimination in rules on nationality (now article 5(1)) was included (as 
one out of five principles) in the convention’s provision on principles that the state parties’ rules on 
nationality shall be based on (now article 4). By contrast, the provision on non-discrimination between 
citizens (now article 5(2)) was framed as an independent rule under the broad heading ‘non-
discrimination between nationals at birth and other nationals’.14  
Admittedly, the primary aim of the provision was non-discrimination between citizens in relation to 
deprivation of citizenship due to crimes committed. However, it is natural to understand article 5(2) on 
a broader basis.
15
 The non-discrimination principle in article 5(1) was at that time described as 
‘applicable to national rules on the acquisition, retention, loss and recovery of nationality’ and it was 
explicitly stressed that this provision was not ‘applicable to national rules other than those on 
nationality’. Against this, it was briefly mentioned that the principle on non-discrimination between 
citizens (now article 5(2)) applied to ‘rules in matters of nationality’.16  
Based on the clarity of the wording of article 5(2) and the lack of support in the preparatory work 
for the restrictive interpretation suggested by the then Danish Ministry of Integration, it seems fair to 
assume that article 5(2) applies broadly to matters relating to citizenship. This broad interpretation is 
also supported in the literature.
17
  
The other question is to what extent state parties are bound by article 5(2) since the provision is not 
formulated as a prohibition against discrimination. The provision stipulates that a state party ‘shall be 
guided by the principle of non-discrimination between its nationals’. According to the preparatory 
work it aims at eliminating the discriminatory application of rules in nationality matters between 
nationals at birth and other nationals, including naturalised persons. An earlier draft of the Explanatory 
Report stated that the words “shall be guided by ...” indicate an obligation of a lesser degree than that 
resulting from article 4; the obligation is nevertheless included with a view to adopting the necessary 
provisions to ensure application of this principle’.18 
The provision in article 5(2) was formulated under the influence of states that wanted continuously 
to be able to treat their citizens differently in relation to deprivation of citizenship due to crimes 
committed against the state. France, for instance, argued that reservations to the provision should be 
allowed.
19
 The majority in the Expert Committee, however, did not want to permit reservations and 
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they reiterated that the provision was a ‘declaration of intent and not a mandatory rule’ – see also the 
Explanatory Report stressing that article 5(2) is not a rule that must be followed ‘in all cases’.20  
In my opinion, part of the argumentation in the Explanatory Report indicates that the states/ Expert 
Committee did not fully understand the very meaning of the notion ‘discrimination’ insofar as they 
seem to have assumed that different treatment based on a listed distinction would in itself amount to 
prohibited discrimination.
21
 Such a mistake of law may have influenced the formulation of the non-
discrimination provisions (article 5(1) and 5(2)).  
A similar (mis)understanding was advanced while Protocol No. 12 to the ECHR (2000) was 
negotiated. Some states wanted a restriction clause to the general non-discrimination principle. 
However, as it is clarified in the Explanatory Report to the Protocol, a difference in treatment is only 
discriminatory if it ‘has no objective and reasonable justification’, that is, if it does not pursue a 
‘legitimate aim’ or if there is not a ‘reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means 
employed and the aim sought to be realised’. Since not every distinction or difference of treatment 
amounts to discrimination, and because of the general character of the principle of non-discrimination, 
it was not considered necessary or appropriate to include a restriction clause in Protocol No. 12. It is 
mentioned in the Explanatory Report to the Protocol that the law of most if not all member states of 
the Council of Europe provides for certain distinctions based on citizenship concerning certain rights 
or entitlements to benefits. The situations where such distinctions are acceptable are sufficiently 
safeguarded by the very meaning of the notion ‘discrimination’, since distinctions which have an 
objective and reasonable justification do not constitute discrimination. 
The (erroneous) idea that it is necessary in advance to identify which distinctions amount to 
discrimination and which do not (the Explanatory Report to ECN para. 42) may explain both the 
limited number of (prohibited) grounds for discrimination in article 5(1) and the efforts made to clarify 
that article 5(2) should not be followed in all cases (para. 45). In 2001, at a Council of Europe 
conference on nationality, attention was called to this problem.
 22
 The query may have been effective 
since an open-ended prohibition against discrimination has been included in the European Convention 
on the Avoidance of Statelessness in relation to State Succession (2006). The development may 
indicate an acknowledgement of what is the right conception of law and may thus support the 
assumption that ECN article 5 was drafted under a misapprehension of the very meaning of the non-
discrimination principle. 
In any case, it is difficult to comprehend that the ECtHR finds that ECN article 5(2) has no bearing 
on the interpretation of Article 14 of the ECHR in the present case. It is explicitly stated in the 
Explanatory Report to the ECN (which the ECtHR has referred to in other cases) that this provision 
aims at eliminating the discriminatory application of rules in matters of citizenship between citizens at 
birth and other citizens, including naturalised persons. Further, during the drafting of the ECN it was 
the general understanding that the Convention should achieve an important status. As stated by a 
lawyer from the Directorate of Legal Affairs, the ECHR is the only treaty whose acceptance is 
compulsory for the member states of the Council of Europe; the drafters thought, though, that it would 
be good if the ECN could acquire the same status as the European Cultural Convention and the 
European Convention for the Prevention of Torture which all aspiring countries feel they need to sign 
to be part of the democratic club. The Convention was expected to impact on existing problems and 
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future potential problems.
23
 In line with this, the Explanatory Report to the Convention (p. 15 and 16) 
states that the Convention is intended to be of relevance for the implementation of other Council of 
Europe- and UN conventions. 
The ECtHR has also in other cases drawn on the convention.
24
 
3.5. Law and practice internationally and in the other European states 
The ECtHR has not in the Biao case dealt with the question whether other European states have 
introduced difference in treatment between their citizens based on how and when they have acquired 
their citizenship. Leaving to one side that some countries as an exception have provided for different 
treatment in relation to specific modes of deprivation of citizenship, that is, as far as I am aware, not 
the case.  
Citizenship is normally considered to be ‘equal’ to all citizens. Some authors have even pointed to 
the ‘almost definitional feature of citizenship that signifies equality among those who hold that 
status’.25 
Also the ECN article 17 can contribute to the understanding of ‘equal citizens’ since it establishes 
that ‘Nationals of a State Party in possession of another nationality shall have, in the territory of that 
State Party in which they reside, the same rights and duties as other nationals of that State Party’. The 
provision seems to be based on the understanding that a country’s nationals enjoy the same – equal – 
rights, including dual nationals. 
The ECtHR has also dealt with and taken notice of ECN article 17 in Tanese v Moldova.
26
 In that 
case, the Court (Grand Chamber) took into consideration the practice of other member states of the 
Council of Europe, observing that very few states treated dual nationals differently from other 
nationals in relation to becoming members of parliament. Moreover, the Court observed that different 
reports and commentaries were unanimous in their criticism of discrimination based on citizenship (p. 
177).  
It is noteworthy that the principle of ‘non-discrimination of nationals’ (cf. ECN article 5(2)) also 
applies in EU-law. In the Auer-I-case, the European Court of Justice stated as follows: 
There is no provision of the Treaty which, within the field of application of the Treaty, makes it 
possible to treat nationals of a Member State differently according to the time at which or the 
manner in which they acquired the nationality of that State, as long as, at the time at which they 
rely on the benefit of the provisions of Community law, they possess the nationality of one of the 
Member States and that, in addition, the other conditions for the application of the rule on which 
they rely are fulfilled.
27
 
Arguably, it might have contributed to the result in the present case if the ECtHR in its assessment of 
the justification of the difference in treatment stemming from the 28-year rule had taken into 
consideration the practice of other European states and the viewpoint of the Commissioner for Human 
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Rights; although the Court drew on the Commissioner’s viewpoints, they do not seem to have 
influenced the judgment. 
3.6. The objective and reasonable justification test 
With reference to Abdulaziz, the ECtHR assumed that the 28-year rule is based on an objective 
criterion since it is permissible for a state to grant special treatment to persons with strong ties to that 
state by virtue of birth within its borders, citizenship and long term residence and since the ECN 
article 5(2) had no relevance for the interpretation of ECHR article 14 in the present case. This last 
crucial point is dealt with in section 3.4. and 3.5, and arguably this is where the Court took the wrong 
track.  
Abdulaziz relates to a state’s different treatment of its citizens based on their birthplace (within or 
outside the state’s borders) while the present case concerns different treatment of citizens based on 
how and when they have acquired their citizenship status. As already mentioned this does not 
correspond with ECN article 5(2) which establishes that states shall be guided by the principle of non-
discrimination between their citizens, whether they are citizens by birth or have acquired their 
citizenship subsequently. 
We must bear in mind that the aim of the 28-year rule was to assure that Danish emigrants could 
(re)settle in Denmark with their foreign family. The delimited period of ‘having been a citizen for 28 
years was, however, not fixed out of consideration for them; rather, the 28-year period was determined 
out of consideration for another group of citizens who were also Danish at birth, namely those with 
immigrant background who might wish to marry in their country of origin at a very young age. Judged 
upon the preparatory work to the 28-year rule, the reasoning appears to have been that if they were 
inclined to follow the identified ‘marriage pattern’ and would marry abroad for instance at the age of 
18 with a view to resettle in Denmark whenever possible, the 28-year rule might constitute an 
obstacle, since they would have to wait for about ten years – and conceivably, such a long waiting 
period might have a deterrent effect. 
For other citizens who have become Danish after birth, the 28-year rule has the obvious effect that 
the attachment requirement is effective until they get on in years; how long will depend on when they 
have acquired their citizenship. Most likely, many who did not come to Denmark as ‘small children’ 
would have to wait at least until they turn 46, since generally, according to Danish law children cannot 
apply independently for naturalisation.
28
  
Even naturalised citizens who are born and raised in Denmark, and who may therefore have the 
opportunity to be exempted from the attachment requirement when they turn 28, may experience 
unequal treatment since the exemption possibility is conditional upon continuous residence in 
Denmark for 28 years. Although there are exceptions from the requirement on continuous residence 
dependent on the purpose of a possible stay abroad (work, education etc.), they do not in general enjoy 
the same free movement rights as persons who are born Danish citizens. To that extent, questions on 
compliance with EU law may also arise. 
The Danish government has argued that the difference in treatment is objectively and reasonably 
justified as there are persuasive social reasons for giving special treatment to persons who have been 
Danish citizens for 28 year, since this group of persons from a general perspective has lasting and 
strong ties with Denmark. Admittedly, it may as a rule be legitimate to treat more favourably persons 
with strong ties to a country. However, this does not in itself establish the legitimacy of the differences 
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made by the 28-year rule regarding different groups of citizens’ possibility to live with their family in 
their country of citizenship. 
As mentioned, in other Europe countries, citizens are, as a rule, treated equally, regardless of how 
and when they have acquired their citizenship (apart from rules on deprivation of citizenship in 
particular cases). In my opinion this calls for very weighty reasons to be advanced before such 
difference in treatment can be considered legitimate. 
The question of legitimacy must be dealt with on a general basis. As maintained by the minority of 
the ECtHR, in a case such as the present, a divide between the law and the factual situation resulting 
from it is not clear cut. This is also in line with the ECtHR’s approach in other cases on 
discrimination, including Abdulaziz.  
In Abdulaziz, the British rules made it easier for a man than for a woman settled in the UK to obtain 
permission for a non-national spouse to enter and remain in the country. The aim was to protect the 
domestic labour market. The ECtHR accepted this aim as legitimate, but was not convinced that the 
difference between the impact of men or women on the labour market was sufficiently important to 
justify the difference of treatment. Based on this assessment the Court concluded that the applicants 
had been victims of discrimination on the ground of sex, in violation of article 14 taken together with 
article 8.
 29
 As rightly stated elsewhere in the literature, it is almost ‘inherent’ in a discrimination 
analysis that a state’s legislation must be analysed when difference of treatment flows from a formal 
legal rule.
30
  
In this light it is surprising that the Court so unambiguously points out that where national 
legislation is the issue, it is not for the Court to review the relevant legislation in the abstract and that 
instead, the Court must examine the concrete facts in the case before it (p.103). In this connection it is 
also surprising that the Court has chosen a particular year, 2004, as the relevant time to determine 
whether there was a lack of proportionality between the means employed and the aim of the 28-year 
rule; for the applicant it was significant that he could not benefit from the 28-year rule that in his case 
would apply until 2030.
31
 
4. Concluding remarks 
As the ECtHR has stated in its case law, a difference of treatment is discriminatory if it has no 
objective and reasonable justification: that is, if it does not pursue a legitimate aim or if there is no 
reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to be 
realised.  
In the present case, there is no disagreement as to whether a country legitimately can provide for 
positive treatment in relation to family reunion in favour of persons who have a strong attachment to 
that country. This is legitimate. There is disagreement, however, as to whether attachment to a country 
can be measured on the basis of how and when a citizen has acquired his or her citizenship. 
In my opinion, the length of time a person has held a country’s citizenship is not a suitable 
criterion. For a number of reasons, that criterion differs from the criteria mentioned in Abdulaziz: birth 
within a country, citizenship as such, and long term residence.  
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Citizenship as such may be seen as an expression of attachment to a country; and yet, the 
legislation in most countries may (in relation to different rights etc.) pose additional attachment 
requirements such as birth or residence in the country. In Denmark, for instance, residence in the 
country is an additional requirement for voting rights at national elections, while on the other hand, 
birth and residence abroad until the age of 22 is taken as an expression of loss of attachment – and 
therefore also as a reason for loss of Danish citizenship (in relation to dual citizens if their attachment 
is not proved in another way, cf. the Nationality Act section 8). 
However, citizenship for a longer or shorter period of time seems unfit to constitute a criterion for 
attachment to a country. Apparently the Danish government also focused on something else, namely 
Danish citizens’ national origin – Danish or foreign. Danish expatriates were exempted from the 
attachment requirement because they were assumed to speak Danish at home, spend holidays in 
Denmark and read Danish newspapers etc., while Danish citizens of immigrant origin in 2002 were 
assumed to lose attachment to Denmark by residence abroad even though they would hold Danish 
citizenship continuously for a longer and longer period. 
Arguably, the ECtHR should have examined whether the alleged aim of providing for family 
reunion in Denmark for persons with strong and lasting ties to the country was served by the 
distinction drawn by the 28-year rule between Danish expatriates and Danish immigrants who had 
acquired their Danish citizenship after birth and consequently, in many cases would not be able to 
benefit from the 28-year rule when they became of marriageable age.  
In the assessment, the Court could have drawn more on the preparatory work to the amendments to 
the Aliens Act of 2002 and 2003 and maybe also, to some extent, on its own case law on expulsion 
etc. where it has tested whether immigrants’ citizenship in the country of origin (the country they have 
emigrated from) reflects more than ‘a legal fact’.32 
In addition, the impact of European citizenship should be taken into consideration. Union 
citizenship has become a desirable status and therefore, it is conceivable that more and more emigrant 
descendants resident in third countries may attempt, maybe generation after generation, to maintain 
European citizenship ‘inherited’ through their ancestors. This may also hold for descendants of Danish 
emigrants. To that extent, Danish citizenship may not merely be an expression of attachment to 
Denmark but rather an expression of a desire for free movement rights within the EU. 
In any case, the non-discrimination principle in ECN article 5(2) and the lack of a similar practice 
in other European states should be taken into consideration with a view to establish whether very 
weighty reasons can justify the difference in treatment following from the application of the 28-year 
rule. In my opinion such very weighty reasons have not been advanced. 
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